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ABSTRACT
In  the  face  of  persistent  rural  poverty,  an  incomplete  agrarian  transition,  the 
predominance  of  small  and  marginal  farms  and  an  emerging  feminization  of 
agriculture, this paper argues for a new institutional approach to poverty reduction, 
agricultural revival and social empowerment. It makes a strong case for a group 
approach to agricultural investment and production through promoting collectivities 
of the poor which, it argues, would be much more effective on all these counts than 
the  traditional  individual-oriented  approaches. The  collectivities  proposed  here, 
however,  are  small-sized,  voluntary,  socio-economically  homogeneous,  and 
participatory in decision-making, and in keeping with the principles emphasized in 
a human-rights approach to development. This is in sharp contrast to the largely 
failed historical efforts at early socialist collectivization, and some similar thrusts in 
non-socialist developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s, which were massive in 
scale, top-down, and typically coercive and non-participatory. The paper outlines the 
WV[LU[PHSILULÄ[ZVMIV[[VT\WHNYPJ\S[\YHSWYVK\J[PVUJVSSLJ[P]P[PLZHUKKLZJYPILZH
YHUNLVMZ\JJLZZM\SJHZLZMYVT[OL[YHUZP[PVULJVUVTPLZHUK:V\[O(ZPH0[HSZVYLÅLJ[Z
on the contexts in which such collectivities may be expected to succeed, and how 
these efforts could be replicated for wider geographic coverage and impact.
Key words: Agricultural production collectivities, food security, women farmers, 
self-help groups, transition economies, group farming
JEL codes: I38, J16, P32, Q153
1. INTRODUCTION
Grassroots action across the globe demonstrates that collectivities of the poor can improve 
their well-being in ways that individual approaches usually cannot. It can enhance their 
incomes, their self-respect, their ability to challenge structural inequalities and oppressive 
social norms, and their bargaining power in markets, both at home and with the State. The 
process of empowerment is especially important—one that recognizes the poor as agents 
rather than simply as welfare recipients—and is more likely to bring long-lasting gains. 
Globally, rural areas have 2.1 billion people living on less than $ 2 a day (and 880 million 
living on less than $ 1 a day). Most of them are involved in agriculture (World Bank 2008). 
The majority are small and marginal farmers, many are landless agricultural labourers, and 
in recent decades an increasing proportion are women. An estimated 70 per cent of those 
living in absolute poverty globally are women, and the number of rural women living in 
absolute poverty is assessed to have risen by 50 per cent over the last two decades relative 
[VWLYJLU[MVYY\YHSTLUÄN\YLZJP[LKPU[OL<50-,4^LIZP[L
In most developing regions there has also been a highly gendered agrarian transition, 
as men, in notably larger numbers than women, have moved to non-farm jobs. In India, for 
instance, agriculture sustains 57 per cent of the population but contributes only 18 per cent 
of the Gross Domestic Product. Agricultural growth rates are low, and the agrarian transition 
has been slow and clearly gendered. As men move out of agriculture, those left behind on 
farms are increasingly women. In 2004–05, 49 per cent of male workers but 65 per cent of 
all women workers and 83 per cent of rural female workers were still employed in agriculture 
(NSSO 2004–05), and their percentage is rising. An estimated 20-35 per cent of households 
are de facto female-headed from widowhood, marital breakdown, or male outmigration 
(GoI 1988),1 and overall 38.9 per cent of all agricultural workers are women (NSSO 2004–
4HU`HYL\ULK\JH[LKHUKWVZZLZZML^ZRPSSZIL`VUKMHYTPUN;OLKLTVNYHWOPJWYVÄSL
of the Indian farmer today is thus a far cry from the young, articulate, new-technology-
ZLLRPUNWYVÄSLWVW\SHYPaLKPU[OL Z2YPZOP+HYZOHU;=WYVNYHTTLZ-HYTZPaLPZHSZV
falling: 70 per cent operated less than 1 ha in 2003 as compared to 56 per cent in 1982 (GOI 
2008), and landlessness is growing (Rawal 2008). Women constitute most of the landless, 
typically owning no land themselves, even when born or married into landed households 
(Agarwal 1994, 2003). Indeed, given intra-household inequalities in resource distribution, 
there are poor women in non-poor households whose work contributions (as unpaid family 
workers) are usually invisible, and who remain atomized and isolated as workers. 
Also, although there is a now a growing recognition that for higher agricultural growth 
we need substantial investment in rural infrastructure, crop research, and improved farming 
1 These estimates are dated but indicative. We would expect rural female-headedness to grow with time, with decreasing 
marital stability and kinship support and increasing male outmigration.4
practices,  there  is  rather  little  recognition  yet  of  the  demographic  shift  toward  female 
farmers. Nor is there enough engagement with the question: will small and increasingly 
female farmers be able to take advantage of this infusion of infrastructural investment, and 
overcome constraints of scale and access bias?
In this paper, which could be characterized as a policy think piece, I argue that for 
alleviating rural poverty, and especially poverty among women, as well as for energizing 
agricultural growth, we need a new institutional approach—a group approach—to rural 
development. Such an approach could prove to be much more effective than individual-
oriented approaches, for tackling deprivation among agrarian populations and enhancing 
their productive potential, especially in resource scarce circumstances. In other words, we 
need to explore a wider range of institutional arrangements for farming than single family 
J\S[P]H[PVU^OPJOPZ[OLUVYTHUKPZVM[LUHZZ\TLK[VILHTVYLLMÄJPLU[MVYTVMLU[LYWYPZL
than a collectivity. I use the term ‘collectivity’ rather than ‘collectives’ or ‘cooperatives’ to 
encompass all forms of joint farm enterprises, and to transcend the particularity associated 
with these earlier terms. 
The form that an agricultural collectivity takes could vary, as could the level of 
collective  endeavour,  ranging  from  simply  joint  investment  in  capital  inputs  to  joint 
production. I outline the potential gains from agricultural collectivities, especially joint 
farming, and examine their prospects for enabling the rural poor and especially women 
to become agents of their own empowerment.2 I argue, however, that the structure of 
such collectivities would need to be rather different from the early historical experiences 
of collective farming in socialist and other contexts. In particular, the new collectivities 
^V\SK ULLK [V JVU[HPU ZPNUPÄJHU[ LSLTLU[Z VM H O\THU YPNO[ZIHZLK HWWYVHJO [V
development, especially equity, accountability, participation and the empowerment of 
vulnerable groups.3 
To demonstrate that such collectivities are not simply a theoretical construct but have 
a basis in contemporary reality, I focus on two types of examples. One relates to countries 
which  undertook  farm  collectivization  and  subsequently  de-collectivized,  but  where, 
despite the option of individual family farming after decollectivization, many households 
chose to form new production cooperatives. The other relates to women’s group farming in 
south India. Although yet other types of production collectivities also exist, such as those 
MVYTLKHYV\UKÄZOWYVK\J[PVUVYJVTT\UP[`MVYLZ[Y`NYV\WMHYTPUNPZVMWHY[PJ\SHYPU[LYLZ[
since  it  relates  to  a  major  resource—agricultural  land—and  there  are  vast  numbers 
2 In this paper, poor implies income poverty, which often overlaps with asset poverty (especially, landlessness). Although 
there are likely to be poor and assetless women in non-poor households, given intra-household inequalities, poor women, 
as referred to here, are both poor themselves and come from poor households.
3 These four elements are especially emphasized in human rights approaches to development (see, for example, Marks 
2003: 6).5




the central features that are seen to underlie the failure of earlier efforts on many counts. I 
then outline the very different characteristics that agricultural collectivities are likely to 
need  for  success.  I  follow  this  with  examples  of  successful  agricultural  production 
collectivities, both from outside South Asia and within it, which embody some or all of 
these principles. Finally, I examine how the success, especially of women’s group farming 
in India, could be replicated, and its geographic coverage and impact enhanced. The 
PSS\Z[YH[P]LL_HTWSLZHYLKYH^UMYVTZWLJPÄJYLNPVUZI\[HNYV\WHWWYVHJO[VHNYPJ\S[\YHS
investment and production would have wider geographic relevance. 
It needs mention, however, that this paper is not cast in a generalized land reform 
framework on which there has been considerable conceptual and policy debate in recent 
years.4 Rather, my primary focus is on the potential of a group approach in empowering 
poor farming households both economically and socially, whatever the source of their 
land—inheritance, markets, or State transfers. State transfers of land to the poor, for instance, 
can occur not only under redistributive land reform but also in other contexts, such as for 
resettling families displaced by large dams or natural disasters (e.g. a tsunami). A group 
approach can, however, also enhance the ability of the poor to gain access to land through 
the market (as elaborated further below).
2. LESSONS FROM HISTORY
2.1 Top-down collectivities
Historically, agricultural collectivities were mainly of two types: production collectivities 
involving some form of joint cultivation, and service collectivities for credit, inputs, or 
marketing. Production collectivities largely failed, especially in the early period (although 
the  subsequent  story  is  more  complex),  while  service  cooperatives  were  relatively 
successful.
Joint cultivation was linked mainly to socialist collectivization, such as in the USSR, 
Eastern Europe, China, and North Vietnam, but during the 1960s and 1970s there were also 
ZPNUPÄJHU[LMMVY[ZPUZVTLUVUZVJPHSPZ[JV\U[YPLZZ\JOHZ,J\HKVYHUK5PJHYHN\HPU3H[PU
America, Ethiopia and Tanzania (the Ujaama policy) in Africa, Israel (the kibbutz) in the 
4 See, for example, the World Bank’s approach to market-led agrarian reform as enunciated by Deninger and Binswanger 
   HUK+LPUPUNLY   HUKP[ZJYP[PX\L)VYYHZ:LLHSZV.YPMÄUL[HSVUYLKPZ[YPI\[P]LSHUKYLMVYTHUK
the critique of their approach by Byres (2004) and others in the Journal of Agrarian Change 2004, 4 (1–2).6
Middle East, and on a minor scale in India. A comprehensive assessment of these early 
experiences—in all their range, complexity, and geographic variability—requires specialized 
scholarly research which is outside the purview of this paper. However, a focus on some 
key features which are recognized to have contributed to their failure, outlined here in 
broad brushstrokes, is meant to provide a background to the current discussion,5 and to 
demarcate those early top-down approaches from the bottom-up group approach I am 
proposing.
:VJPHSPZ[JVSSLJ[P]PaH[PVU^HZJOHYHJ[LYPaLKI`Ä]LMLH[\YLZ^OPJOOHKLZWLJPHSS`
negative outcomes: coercive pooling of small peasant farms, compulsory requisitioning of 
produce,  vast  sizes  of  production  enterprises,  farmers’  lack  of  voice  in  management 
decisions, and, hidden as well as explicit, forms of socio-economic inequality, including 
gender inequality.6 In other words, they violated all the principles of a human rights 
approach mentioned above. In most part, the effects of the massive forced collectivization 
on productivity and human welfare in the early period proved highly adverse.7 In the 
USSR and China they were associated with famines and the deaths of millions of people 
and animals. Some countries in Eastern Europe, such as Hungary, escaped this fate by 
shifting  course  fairly  soon  after  launching  collectivization  by  abolishing  compulsory 
deliveries,  allowing  households  to  keep  small  individual  plots,  and  initiating  farmer 
support measures (Swain 1985, 1992; Berend 1990). Elsewhere, as in North Vietnam, 
persuasion soon gave way to coercion as pressure for rapid collectivization increased, and 
production and living conditions deteriorated (Kerkvliet 2003). Lin (1990) demonstrates 
the critical importance of voluntariness—the ability to exit the collective—in determining 
the impact on productivity in China, and attributes the collapse of Chinese agricultural 
production during 1959–61 to ‘the deprivation of the right to withdraw from the collective 
in the fall of 1958’ (Lin 1990: 2229).8 
Outside state socialism, the promotion of joint farming was different from that in 
ZVJPHSPZ[JV\U[YPLZPUZVTLZPNUPÄJHU[YLZWLJ[ZI\[ZPTPSHYPUV[OLYZ4HU`VM[OLZLPUP[PH[P]LZ
in the 1960s and 1970s were propelled by pro- small peasant land reforms (Ghose 1983), 
I\[PUÅ\LUJLKI`ZVJPHSPZ[HZZ\TW[PVUZVMSHYNLMHYTLMÄJPLUJ`)YVHKS`QVPU[J\S[P]H[PVU
was promoted either by pooling small farms into large cooperatives as in Ethiopia and 
Tanzania,  or  by  constituting  cooperatives  on  State  controlled  land  (including  that 
5 See Agarwal (2008) for more details.
6 See especially Robinson (1967) and Nove (1969) for the USSR; Lin (1990) and Putterman (1997) for China; Swain (1985, 
1992) for Hungary; and Goyal (1966) for an overview of several countries. 
7 See Robinson (1967) and Nove (1969) for the USSR; and Lin (1990) and Putterman (1997) for China. Deininger (1993) 
also shows that productivity was much lower under forced collectivization in China (1959–6) and North Vietnam (1958–
71) than in subsequently de-collectivized farms. See also Hanstad (1998) on the former Soviet republics. 
8 Lin notes that it took 23 years, minus the World War II years, for productivity to reach the pre-World War I level.7
JVUÄZJH[LKMYVTSHYNLV^ULYZHZPU5PJHYHN\H,J\HKVYHUK0ZYHLS0UZVTLJV\U[YPLZ
both forms were promoted. 
Although  usually  initiated  under  the  principle  of  voluntariness,  the  process  often 
became coercive under government pressure for speedy implementation.9 Also, common 
to all these initiatives were the very large sizes of farms and top-down management.10 In 
Ethiopia, for instance, in the mid-1970s, some 20,000 peasant associations with 5 million 
members were created within a year, with each collective cultivating 800 ha on average 
(Alula and Kiros 1983). In parts of Ecuador each farm was around 10,000 ha (Borda 1971). 
Such  large  farms  made  farmer  participation  in  planning  and  management  virtually 
impossible. Women, in any case, were rarely involved in decision-making on state farms 
(Deere and Leon 2001). And the productivity and welfare outcomes of the collectives were 
mixed and regionally variable. There were gains in some regions but not in others and the 
overall impact on poverty reduction was limited.11 
The production cooperatives also performed service functions, such as joint procurement 
of inputs and marketing, but solely service collectivities did not involve joint cultivation. 
Established  during  the  1950s  and  1960s  in  many  countries,  service  cooperatives  were 
successful to greater extent than production cooperatives (Deininger 1993; Inayatullah 1972). 
But class, gender and other social differences were largely ignored in their formation, leaving 
them dominated by men and the better-off. For women, both social structure and an inbuilt 
gender bias proved exclusionary. Membership was limited to one person per household. This 
was typically the male household head, even though women’s farm work was vital in all 
regions, as was their involvement in marketing in many regions (UNRISD 1975). 
)V[OWYVK\J[PVUHUKZLY]PJLJVSSLJ[P]P[PLZWYV]LKTVYLILULÄJPHS[VJVTT\UP[PLZ
^OLYL ZVJPVLJVUVTPJ PULX\HSP[PLZ ^LYL SV^ ZVSPKHYP[` HUK ZVJPHS HMÄUP[` HTVUN [OL
participating farmers was high, the units were not large in scale, and there was effective 
democratic authority and a willingness to remove non-performers (Inayatullah 1972).12 
9 See, for example, Alula and Kiros (1983) for Ethiopia; Ibhawoh and Dbua (2003) and Scott (1999) for Tanzania; and 
Carlos (1988) for Nicaragua.
10 See, for example, Alula and Kiros (1983) for Ethiopia, Scott (1999) for Tanzania, Borda (1971) for Ecuador; and Mort 
and Brenner (2003) and Gavron (200) for Israel.
11 These effects deserve in-depth probing, which is not possible here, but some early assessments are illustrative. Some 
regions in Latin America, for instance, showed production increases with improved technology (Borda 1971) but in others 
the incomes of the landless declined (Peek 1983). Similarly, Alula and Kiros (1983) report an increase in food consump-
tion and incomes in Ethiopia, but assessments for Tanzania point more to non-economic than economic gains (Ibhawoh 
and Dbua 2003). See also UNRISD (1975) for a summary of the results from studies that UNRISD sponsored in the late 
1960s, to examine the performance of cooperatives in Asia, Latin America and Africa. These are especially revealing of 
the early emerging effects.
12:LLHSZV)VYKH HUK9\ILUHUK3LYTHUVU[OLPTWVY[HUJLVMZVJPHSHMÄUP[PLZPU[OLLHYS`Z[HNLZVMJVS-
lectivization in Latin America. Borda especially highlights local, family, and ritual ties.8
These elements can prove critical for successful cooperation, as demonstrated by recent 
experience of production collectivities in the transition economies and India (detailed 
further below). 
0UKPH»ZL_WLYPTLU[Z^P[OJVVWLYH[P]LZZ[YVUNS`PUÅ\LUJLKI`*OPUHPU[OL Z
and 1960s, provide similar lessons. Cooperatives were seen as a major instrument of rural 
economic development which appealed to both socialists and Gandhians (Frankel 1978). 
However, early attempts to promote joint farming encountered strong resistance from large 
landowners supporting the ruling Congress party, and most state governments shelved the 
idea, barring a few pilot experiments. Goyal (1966: 122) found only 111 joint farms in six 
Punjab  districts  in  1958.13  Solely  service  cooperatives  were  geographically  more 
^PKLZWYLHKI\[THPUS`ILULÄ[LKSHYNLHUKTLKP\TMHYTLYZ-YHURLS ! 0U[PTL
V[OLY[`WLZVMZLY]PJLJVVWLYH[P]LZLTLYNLK^OPJOKPKILULÄ[[OLZTHSSWYVK\JLYZ\JOHZ
Anand, the highly successful milk cooperative in Gujarat, and the sugar cooperatives of 
Maharashtra.14  Although  these  are  often  called  producers  cooperatives,  in  fact  they 
undertook  no  joint  production  but  simply  undertook  joint  marketing  of  individual 
producers’ goods. 
In most of these collectivities the family was the participating unit. Hence although 
the gender effects of collectivization are little discussed in the literature, it can be surmised 
that in collectives formed within non-socialist regimes—with some exceptions, such as 
the kibbutz—women remained largely embedded in traditional roles and positions of 
disempowerment.15 Where they became direct members in producer cooperatives, it was 
on unequal terms.16 Even within socialist regimes, women got an unequal deal. In Soviet 
Union’s collective farms, women were concentrated in manual jobs that were designated 
less skilled and received lower remuneration. Only 0.8 per cent of tractor drivers and 1.4 
per cent of machine handlers were women, and 85 per cent of women employees relative 
to 66 per cent of men in collectivized farms performed tasks termed as unskilled (Swain 
1985: 99). In China, in 1973, the gender differential in average work points was 2.5 
(Swain 1985: 98–99). In Vietnam, again, women received harder tasks and fewer work 
points than men (Kerkvliet 2005: 91). In India, except in women-headed households, 
men represented the family, and production cooperatives were constituted by family units 
as was membership in service cooperatives. This needs emphasis, since the successful 
13 Projecting from these 6 districts, he estimates that Punjab as a whole had 198 joint cooperative farming societies, 44 
per cent of all cooperative societies in the state.
14 See Somjee and Somjee (1978) and Mascarenhas (1988) on Anand, and Baviskar (1980) on the sugar cooperatives.
15 In Latin America even in service cooperatives, as noted, the members were typically men. See also Deere and 
Leon (2001).
16 See Deere and Leon (2001) on male bias in the membership of production cooperatives in Latin America. In Nicaragua 
women formed only 11 per cent of the members in the 1980s.9
cases  of  group  farming  in  India  described  further  below  break  this  pattern  and  are 
constituted of women alone.
In overview then, the early historical experience of collective farming within the 
socialist context, characterized by coercive formation, large-sized units, compulsory grain 
requisitioning, and top-down decision making was marked by strong disincentives for the 
farmers  and  brought  few  of  the  expected  gains  in  productivity  and  human  welfare. 
Collectives in non-socialist regimes, although somewhat more voluntary, were yet not free 
from coercion, had large production units, top-down management, and little adaptation to 
local conditions. And, gender inequality was inbuilt in both the socialist and non-socialist 
contexts.
Notably, however, in countries where the initial large collectives were subsequently 
downsized and peasants were allowed to leave them, a large number survived. In Central 
Asia, Eastern Europe and parts of Latin America, when de-collectivization was initiated 
many farming families, for varied reasons, continued to work together in reformed collective 
institutional arrangements, or formed new bottom-up groups for joint cultivation on the 
restituted land (see section 4 below). This suggests that it was the particular features of early 
socialist collectivization which contributed to the adverse effects, rather than the infeasibility 
of cooperative production or collective action per se. The early failures, however, continue 
to be barriers to policy rethinking on collective approaches to farming.
2.2 Conceptualizing bottom-up collectivities
(Z\JJLZZM\SMYHTL^VYRMVYZTHSSMHYTLYHNYPJ\S[\YL^OPJO^V\SKHSZVM\SÄS[OL[LUL[ZVMH
human rights approach to development, requires a substantially different kind of production 
collectivity than these early historical examples. In particular, from the lessons learnt we 







transparently by the members. 
As discussed below, the successful cases of agricultural production collectivities today 
have most or all of these features.10
3. POTENTIAL GAINS FROM BOTTOM-UP COLLECTIVITIES
Collective farm activity could range from simply joint investment in lumpy (physically 
indivisible) inputs such as agricultural machinery, to land pooling and joint cultivation by 
small owners, or even joint land acquisition by purchase or lease. Especially where small 
and marginal farmers predominate, there could be gains in productivity as well as bargaining 
power in acting jointly rather than individually. This is likely to be even more the case with 
women farmers. In India, for instance, although farmers are increasingly female, few women 
have direct access to agricultural land. Families transfer land mostly to male heirs, the State 
transfers land largely to male household heads, and markets favour men over women, since 
[OL`OH]LTVYLÄUHUJPHSYLZV\YJLZ(NHY^HS  >VTLUMHYTLYZHSZVMHJLTHSL
bias in extension and credit access, and social restrictions on their mobility and interactions 
in the marketplace which hinder input procurement and product sale.17 Rather few women 
are themselves members of service cooperatives. Hence, although it is well recognized by 
policy makers in developing countries that agriculture needs to provide both higher output 
and viable livelihoods, the substantial recent focus on infrastructure (irrigation, roads, etc.) 
and research and extension, in countries such as India (see, e.g. the 11th Five Year Plan: 
GOI 2008), begs the question: by what institutional arrangement will it be ensured that 
small, marginal and increasingly female farmers have access to the infrastructure? A bottom-
up, more collective approach to farming could provide an answer. 
At the least, a group approach could help small and marginal farmers to undertake 
S\TW`PU]LZ[TLU[ZI`WVVSPUNÄUHUJPHSYLZV\YJLZ0[PZUV[LJVUVTPJHSS`]PHISLMVYMHYTLYZ
operating one or two hectares, especially if fragmented, to invest in tubewells or machinery 
such as tractors, or even keep a pair of bullocks. An active rental market can help with 
tractors and bullocks, but water leasing requires other essentials, such as negotiating a 
WHZZHNLMVY^H[LYJOHUULSZHUKTHUHNPUN^H[LYÅV^ZHSSVM^OPJOHYLTVYLKPMÄJ\S[PMH[
all possible) to undertake through rental arrangements. Here joint investment by small 
farmers with contiguous plots could provide a solution. Groups can also undertake rain 
water harvesting or soil conservation more economically than individuals. 
In addition, for the landless, a group approach can increase market access to land. By 
WVVSPUNÄUHUJPHSYLZV\YJLZHUKULNV[PH[PUNQVPU[S`NYV\WZJHUWYV]LT\JOTVYLLMMLJ[P]L
[OHUPUKP]PK\HSZMVYW\YJOHZPUNVYSLHZPUNPUSHUK(NHPU[OPZ^V\SKLZWLJPHSS`ILULÄ[
women, who typically lack the funds to operate effectively in land markets. This process 
could be furthered with State-subsidized credit for land purchase or leasing in by groups.
Group farming by pooling owned land or jointly leased land, however, involves a much 
higher level of cooperation than simply joint investment in inputs, and would be more 
17 See Agarwal (1994, 2003) for South Asia; see also IFPRI (2001) for Africa.11
KPMÄJ\S[[VHJOPL]LI\[P[JHUHSZVIYPUNNYLH[LYWYVK\J[P]P[`NHPUZHUKZVJPHSLTWV^LYTLU[
as compared with individual production units, for several reasons. First, it can help spread 
the risk of farming among a larger number and increase production opportunities. Cultivating 
as a group, farmers would be better placed to experiment with higher value, more risk-
WYVULJYVWZ^P[OSHYNLYWH`VMMZ0[^V\SKHSZVLUSHYNLJOVPJLZMVYJYVWKP]LYZPÄJH[PVUZPUJL
a collective pool of land is more likely to have soil variety. 
Second, land pooling can increase the cultivable area since boundaries and bunding 
IL[^LLUÄLSKZILJVTLYLK\UKHU[HUK[OLZH]LKHYLHJV\SKILJ\S[P]H[LKZLLHSZV.HUN\SP
1953). By enabling consolidation, fragmentation would also be reduced. 
Third, joint cultivation allows labour sharing and easy substitution for a member who 
PZ[LTWVYHYPS`\UHISL[V^VYRK\L[VPSSULZZVYV[OLYL_PNLUJ`;OPZJHULZWLJPHSS`ILULÄ[
marginal farmers, who would also gain from labour pooling for peak season needs, for 
which they may normally be dependent mainly on family labour. In general too, there 
^V\SKILSLZZJVUÅPJ[JVTWL[P[PVUIL[^LLUMHYTLYZMVYVI[HPUPUNL_[YHSHIV\YK\YPUNWLHR
periods. Traditionally, labour exchange systems served these needs to some extent, but such 
arrangements have declined over time, and cannot commonly be found except among 
women in certain regions (Agarwal 2000). Also, a collectivity would bring together a greater 
diversity of skills, talents, and knowledge than found in one person or family. Skill pooling 
can bring higher returns. For women farmers, a group can bring into the fold women with 
leadership qualities or scarce managerial skills.
Fourth, a group would be better placed to enter into non-exploitative contract farming 
arrangements. It is now increasingly common for companies requiring an assured supply of 
agricultural raw materials, or running food processing and retailing chains, to enter into 
contracts with farmers. Typically these arrangements are with individuals rather than with 
farmers’ groups. Evidence from Latin America and India shows that such arrangements 
ZLSKVTILULÄ[ZTHSSHUKTHYNPUHSMHYTLYZ except in the rare cases where the contracts are 
with a group of farmers and there are protective laws in place.18 Companies usually contract 
larger farmers (Singh 2000).19 Small farmers, where involved, face exploitative terms: prices 
are often low, capital and input transfers rare, and farmers risk crop rejection on grounds of 
uneven quality. Women in farm households often lose out since their workload increases 
under contract farming while men control the cash generated (Collins 1993). Intra-family 
tensions have also increased in some countries (Bulow and Sorensen 1993, cited in Kumar 
2006). And nutrition can suffer when the land is diverted from food to commercial crops, 
but the money generated is not spent on food. 
18 For Mexico, see specially, Runsten and Key (1996); and for India, see Singh (2000) and Kumar (2006).
19 See also Warning, Key and Soo Hoo (n.d., c 2000) for case studies on Mexico and Senegal on why small farmers get 
excluded.12
0U0UKPH[OLYHYLL_HTWSLZVMILULÄ[ZÅV^PUN[VZTHSSHUKTHYNPUHSMHYTLYZYLSH[L
to cases where the farmers have entered into collective contracts. In the Punjab, for 
instance, the Mahindra Shubhlabh Services Ltd. followed a consortium approach, with 
contractual safeguards for risk protection for maize farming. In South India, the United 
Planter’s Association  signed  contracts  with  women’s  self-help  groups  (SHGs)  for  tea 
cultivation, with some companies buying 90 per cent of their tea from SHGs (Singh 
2000). Basically, unless the small and marginal are organized into groups or cooperatives, 
their bargaining power with companies remains weak. A group could negotiate better 
terms, afford legal aid to ensure non-exploitative terms, and obtain crop insurance which 
PU0UKPHPZOPNOS`:[H[LZ\IZPKPaLKPULMÄJPLU[HUK\ULX\HSS`KPZ[YPI\[LK.OVZOHUK
Yadav 2008). Contracts given to women’s groups could also ensure that both men and 
women gain. 
Fifth, a farmers’ collectivity would be more socially empowered than individuals. It 
can improve the clout of farmers with government agencies and so their access to formal 
credit,  inputs  and  information  (see  also  Braverman  et  al.  1991).  In  this  sense  too  the 
collective can serve as a bargaining unit. Also cooperative risk-pooling via joint liability for 
default  can  enhance  the  borrower’s  credit  worthiness  (Deininger  1993).  Moreover, 
relationships  developed  while  working  together  can  come  in  handy  during  illness  or 
personal misfortune. Such potential non-economic payoffs could propel cooperation, even 
when the economic payoffs are not large.
Sixth, groups would be better placed than individuals to deal with short-term shocks 
such as rising food prices and long-term disasters due to climate change. The rural poor are 
net buyers and not net sellers of foodgrains. The recent rise in foodgrain prices is estimated 
to have added millions more to the numbers of the poor, globally.20 As a group, the poor 
would be better protected both as producers and as consumers. As producers, they would 
OH]LIL[[LYWYVZWLJ[ZVMTV]PUNMYVTILPUNKLÄJP[[VZ\YWS\ZMHYTLYZHUKZVNHPUPUNMYVT
the price rise) through improved access to infrastructure and technology, and greater ability 
to take advantage of higher value crops or contract farming arrangements. As consumers, 
they would be better able to undertake income smoothing.
;OLZLILULÄ[ZVMSHUKWVVSPUNQVPU[PU]LZ[TLU[HUKJVSSLJ[P]LJ\S[P]H[PVUULLKUV[IL
JVUÄULK[V[OVZL^OVHSYLHK`V^USHUKI\[JV\SKL_[LUK[V[OLSHUKSLZZSLHZPUNPUSHUK
Moreover, all these advantages would be compounded if the collectivities were formed of 
women farmers, given the constraints they face in operating individually, such as their lack 
VMJVU[YVSV]LYSHUKHUKTHQVYHZZL[ZYLZV\YJLHUKÄUHUJPHSSPTP[H[PVUZPUPUW\[W\YJOHZL
20(ZZLZZTLU[ZKPMMLYI\[0]HUPJHUK4HY[PU»ZÄN\YLZHYLPSS\Z[YH[P]L;OL`HZZLZZ[OH[TPSSPVUWLVWSL^LYL
added to the world’s poor in low income countries (out of a low income population of 2.3 billion), due to rising food 
prices since 2005.13
and capital investment, social restrictions on mobility and public interaction, and greater 
]\SULYHIPSP[`[VTHYRL[Z^PUNZVYJSPTH[PJZOPM[Z0U[LYNLULYH[PVUHSILULÄ[ZJHUHSZVHJJY\L
in that daughters of successful women farmers would be better placed to move out of 
agriculture  to  skilled  non-farm  jobs,  propelling  a  more  gender-balanced  agrarian 
transition.
The groups would, however, need to overcome the classic problem of free riding, such 
as  work  shirking  in  group  cultivation.21  Here  small  group  size  and  socio-economic 
homogeneity would help since small groups, constituted of people who know each other, 
can enforce penalties for shirkers through weekly meetings, management committees or 
other methods, and also exert moral pressure for compliance.
Can this potential inherent in agricultural production collectivities be realized in 
practice? I believe so. There are diverse examples of farmers successfully cooperating, 
ranging  from  jointly  investing  in  lumpy  inputs  such  as  irrigation  technology  or  farm 
machinery, to pooling owned, purchased or leased-in land for joint cultivation. 
4. GROUP FARMING: GROUND EXAMPLES
There are two types of examples of group farming which particularly warrant our attention. 
;OLÄYZ[[`WLYLSH[LZ[VJV\U[YPLZPU*LU[YHS(ZPH,HZ[LYU,\YVWLHUK3H[PU(TLYPJH
which  undertook  large-scale  collectivization  during  the  1950s  to  1970s,  but  de-
collectivized in the 1980s and 1990s, enabling farmers to revert to individual family 
farming. Many, however, chose to form new group enterprises on the restituted land, or to 
continue in much downsized and transformed former collectives. The second type of 
example, drawn from India, has several distinct features, the most important being that 
the groups are constituted only of women rather than of entire households pooling land 
and resources. Both types of examples, however, demonstrate the potential of farmers 
voluntarily working together in agricultural production collectivities for the output and 
security gains they bring, and the resource constraints they help overcome, apart from 
UVULJVUVTPJILULÄ[Z
4.1 Reconstituted collectivities in transition economies
The de-collectivization of former collectivized agriculture did not lead straightforwardly 
to individual family farming, as advocates of private enterprise or sceptics of collective 
action might have expected. In fact, as recent studies on Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia, 
Romania and East Germany in Eastern Europe, and Nicaragua in Latin America show, 
21 See Olsen (1965) on free riding. Since then, economists have recognized that many factors can contain free riding, 
including norms of trust and reciprocity within societies and peer pressure and vigilance within small groups.14
many households constituted new collective enterprises, or returned to some form of 
prior collective enterprise, or stayed on in a smaller reformed collective. In Romania, for 
example, by 1993, 43 per cent of the de-collectivized agricultural land had returned to 
cooperative forms of production on a voluntary basis (Sabates-Wheeler 2002: 1737). In 
the Kyrgyz Republic, family cooperatives constituted 63.6 per cent of all farm enterprises 
in 1997 (Sabates-Wheeler and Childress 2004: 6); and in East Germany, in the mid-
1990s, family partnerships covered 22 per cent of the total cultivated area (Mathijs and 
Swinnen 2001: 102). Clearly many households saw advantages in group production over 
individual farming.
This is further borne out by the analysis, based on primary data that these studies 
WYV]PKL^OPJOKLTVUZ[YH[LZ[OH[ZTHSSMHTPS`JVVWLYH[P]LZJHUWYV]LTVYLLMÄJPLU[[OHU
individual family farms, in given contexts. The broad features of there cooperatives are 
summarized in Table 1. In all four countries, substantial numbers of family-based cooperatives 
coexist with individual family farms, as well as with other types of collective farms, such as 
reformed large State farms. These family cooperatives differ a great deal in the number of 
families constituting them and in their pooled farm size. In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, some 
are constituted of as few as 2 and others of as many as 48 families, the typical group ranging 
from 4 to 15 families, often related by blood (Sabates-Wheeler 2004, 2006). Groups larger 
than  13  families,  however,  face  problems  of  cooperation  (personal  communication, 
Malcolm Childress 2009). In Romania, similarly, Sabates-Wheeler (2002, 2006) found that 
family cooperatives are made up of anything between 3 and 20 households, and these are 
usually friends, relatives, or neighbours who have come together to farm collectively. In 
East Germany again, each family cooperative is constituted of a few families who know 
each  other  (Mathijs  and  Swinnen  2001).  The  mean  area  cultivated  by  these  family 
cooperatives varies from 16 ha in Kyrgyzstan to 41 ha in Romania, while in Nicaragua and 
East Germany, where families often cooperate not only for cultivation but also over livestock, 
the average farm is larger, namely 420 ha and 450 ha respectively. In Nicaragua, most 
cooperatives  have  individually  managed  home  plots  for  food,  and  collectively  grow 
additional crops for food or cash, while cattle are individually owned but pastures are 
collectively owned and managed (personal communication, Ruerd Ruben, October 2009). 
The  objectives  of  forming  groups  also  vary, MYVT WYPTHYPS` M\SÄSSPUN IHZPJ ULLKZ HUK
HSSL]PH[PUN WV]LY[` HZ PU 2`YN`aZ[HU [V LUOHUJPUN IV[O Z\IZPZ[LUJL HUK WYVÄ[Z HZ PU









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































economically, or to have performed better on other counts, than individual family farms. In 
Kyrgyzstan, Sabates-Wheeler and Childress (2004: 13) found that the total annual income 
from crop production in the family cooperatives was several times higher than that of 
PUKP]PK\HSMHTPS`MHYTZ;V[HSMHJ[VYWYVK\J[P]P[`PUMHTPS`JVVWLYH[P]LZ^HZHSZVZPNUPÄJHU[S`
higher. Similarly, in Romania, family cooperatives compared with individual family farms 
OHKZ\IZ[HU[PHSS`OPNOLYJYVW`PLSKZVM^OLH[THPaLHUKZ\UÅV^LYJVUZPZ[LU[S`OPNOLY
labour productivity across the entire farm size range, and higher land productivity up to 
about 6.5 hectares, after which individual family farms did better (Sabates-Wheeleer 2002). 
In East Germany, Mathijs and Swinnen (2001: 106) establish that family cooperatives are 
º[OLTVZ[LMÄJPLU[VYNHUPaH[PVUHSMVYTJVTIPUPUNOPNOSL]LSZVMW\YL[LJOUPJHSLMÄJPLUJ`
due to good labor governance with low employment, often relatives, and full economies of 
scale by operating on larger farms than average family farms’. In other words, the family 
cooperatives produce much greater output with given inputs of land, labour, and capital. In 
Nicaragua, households belonging to earlier collectivized farms which chose to remain 
together in smaller groups after de-collectivization were found to have a higher standard of 
living than those which moved to individual family farming, although overall incomes were 
UV[ZPNUPÄJHU[S`KPMMLYLU[IL[^LLU[OL[^V[`WLZVMMHYTZ9\ILUHUK3LYTHU
Among the important reasons for forming or remaining in collectives were better and 
TVYLZLJ\YLHJJLZZ[VSHUKHUKVYTHJOPULY`ZOHYLKWYVK\J[PVUYPZRPU[OLHIZLUJLVM
agricultural insurance, advantages of labour and skill pooling, economies of scale, and 
better access to cooperative services and credit (Table 1). In Nicaragua, farmers also said 
they enjoyed working together. Many of the family groups would not have had secure 
access to land, or adequate labour, machinery, skills or credit, or been able to enjoy 
economies of scale, if they had gone it alone. Working together helped build social capital 
HZ^LSS*SVZLZVJPHS[PLZHZYLSH[P]LZMYPLUKZVYULPNOIV\YZHUKVYSVUNL_WLYPLUJLVM
working together has helped sustain cooperation and reduced free riding, although as 
Childress found, in subsistence contexts, it helps to keep the number of cooperating families 
small (personal communication, Malcolm Childress, June 2009). All the studies emphasize 
the need to consider a range of institutional forms for farming, depending on the local 
context, with group farming having particular advantages in situations of resource scarcity 
and uncertainty. 
These examples satisfy several of the conditions mentioned above as likely to make for 
successful cooperation. They are all based on voluntariness. All of them have chosen groups 
over individual family forms. The farm area is small under largely subsistence agriculture, 
as in Kyrgyzstan and Romania, and of medium size where more commercial and livestock 
farming  is  involved,  as  in  East  Germany  and  Nicaragua. And  the  groups  are  socially 
cohesive—the cooperating households forming groups have close social ties. Additional 17
MH]V\YHISLMLH[\YLZPUJS\KLHMHPYKPZ[YPI\[PVUVM^VYRHUKILULÄ[ZHTVUN[OLJVVWLYH[PUN
households, and participative decision-making. This is documented for some countries and 
can be inferred for the others, since the groups are unlikely to survive under unfair work-
sharing and distributional arrangements. In Romania and Kyrgyzstan, for instance, the 
harvest of staple crops and the returns from collectively marketed cash crops are shared 
equitably, and decision-making is consensual. In Nicaragua too farmers can participate in 
decision-making, although in more formal and indirect ways; here decisions are made in 
regularly held assemblies where all members can vote, but the board (annually elected) has 
Z\IZ[HU[PHSPUÅ\LUJLWLYZVUHSJVTT\UPJH[PVU9\LYK9\ILU6J[VILY 
Unfortunately we know rather little from these studies about the impact on gender 
relations.  Sabates-Wheeler  (2006:  21)  mentions  in  passing  an  all-women  production 
cooperative in Kyrgyzstan; and possibly many of the cooperative members in the mixed-
gender groups are de-facto women household heads, given that in these countries (other 
than Nicaragua) women still have a substantial presence as agricultural workers: in 2006 
they constituted 35 per cent of the total agricultural labour in Kyrgyzstan, 45 per cent in 
Romania, 37 per cent in Germany as a whole, and 10 per cent in Nicaragua (FAO statistics 
2006). More research on the gendered implications of family cooperatives and other forms 
of production collectivities operating today would be revealing. Deere and Leon (2001: 
967), for instance, mention that in the 1990s, a thousand women in Nicaragua formed 
production collectives when there was a growing demand for land by women. It would be 
useful to know how well these are functioning.
4.2 Bottom-up collectivities in South Asia
The second type of notable agricultural production collectivities are located in India. They 
are distinct from the family cooperatives of the transition economies in being constituted 
entirely of women, even where the women’s families are cultivating small parcels of land. 
Although examples of Indian farmers jointly investing in irrigation wells can be found 
both historically (Punjab’s sanjh system goes back to the early 20th century: Goyal 1966, 
Darling 1947), and in the contemporary period (I found many male farmers collectively 
investing in tubewells in Alwar district, Rajasthan), group cultivation involves a much higher 
scale of cooperation. Almost all successful examples of this involve poor women farmers, 
supported by local NGOs and state schemes. Here the age-old assumption that farms are to 
be cultivated only on a family basis was abandoned to encourage and support joint farming 
by groups of women. The earliest and best-known initiative comes from Andhra Pradesh. 
With the support of the Deccan Development Society (DDS) which works in Medak district 
(a drought-prone tract), poor, low-caste women have been leasing in or purchasing land in 
groups, through various government credit schemes, and cultivating the land collectively. 18
There is as yet no quantitative study of DDS’ farming groups that is based on a systematically 
JOVZLUZHTWSLI\[PU[OL  ZHUKLHYS`Z0THKLZL]LYHSÄLSK]PZP[Z[V++:HZKPKH
young researcher whom I was guiding. The discussion here is based on an update of that 
LHYSPLYÄLSK^VYRHUK[OVZL^YP[PUNZPUT\JOHIIYL]PH[LKMVYT22 The insights this initiative 
provides are of central relevance for any future effort at promoting group farming in India.
The central plank of DDS’ approach is to ensure food security in an environmentally 
friendly way, through organic farming and multiple cropping. The group leasing programme 
was initiated in 1989. In 2008 it involved 144 women organized into groups (sangams) of 
5 to 15 across 26 villages, cultivating a total of 211 acres (= 85 ha).23 About 25 per cent of 
the rent is paid by sangam members, and the rest is covered by interest free loans from 
DDS, which the groups then repay in instalments. Very poor women who lack cash can 
repay their share through labour. All tasks are shared except ploughing for which they hire 
tractor services. After paying the rent and other costs, as well as DDS’s loan, and keeping 
aside grain for seed, the harvest of each crop is shared equally among the members. Some 
groups lease land from more than one landlord. Typically, when the lease of say 3-5 years 
LUKZ[OLNYV\WULNV[PH[LZHUL^SLHZL:VTL[PTLZH[[OPZWVPU[[OLTLTILYZYLJVUÄN\YL
into new groups. The state government has also allowed women’s groups to use loan money 
from other anti-poverty schemes for land leasing.
A related innovation has been group farming on land purchased by groups of 
women. This draws on a state government scheme that provides subsidized credit to groups 
of landless dalit women for collectively buying agricultural land. Half the money is a grant 
and half is a loan repayable within 20 years. Catalysed by DDS, women form a group and 
apply for the loan after identifying the land they want to buy. The purchased land is divided 
equally  among  the  group  members  and  registered  in  individual  names.  In  2008,  25 
women’s groups constituted of 436 women were cultivating 555 acres (= 224 ha) of 
purchased land in 21 villages. Each woman owned one acre (and sometimes less), but 
pooled her land with 10 to 12 other women to farm it jointly as a group. None of these 
women could have purchased such land or cultivated it as productively on an individual 
basis.24 Most of the sangam women are dalits while the farmers from whom they lease or 
purchase land are predominantly upper-caste men, with a small proportion being Muslims 
22 For a more detailed discussion, see especially Agarwal (2003). Additional information was obtained from DDS in 
  October 2009. The discussion in Agarwal (2003) is based on Satheesh (1997a, 1997b), Hall (1999) who undertook 
her   research in close interaction with me, Menon (1996), and DDS (1994–95). I also draw on my discussions with 
7=:H[OLLZO9\RTPUP9HVHUKTHU`^VTLU»ZZHUNHTZHUKRL`^VTLUPUMVYTHU[ZK\YPUNZL]LYHSÄLSK]PZP[Z[V++:
IL[^LLU  HUK9LJLU[ÄN\YLZ^LYLWYV]PKLKI`:\YLZO2\THYVM++:
23 One acre = 0.40468 hectares.
24 Even many landless male farmers in this district, who received an acre each under the government’s land reform programme, 
could not cultivate it effectively on their own and were later helped by the women’s committees (see further below).19
or backward castes. The sangam women are seen as reliable tenants. Hence, despite caste 
hierarchy, many landlords now approach them for leasing out their land, in contrast to the 
initial period when it was women who approached the landlords for a lease. The landlords 
ILULÄ[ZPUJL[OLPY\UKLY\ZLKSHUKNL[ZJ\S[P]H[LKHUK[OL^VTLUNHPUHSP]LSPOVVK
Usually leasing precedes purchase. This helps women judge the land’s quality and 
potential productivity, assess how well they can function as a group, and in some cases 
even save enough from good harvests to buy land. The lease groups typically consist of a 
mix of landless women and women whose households own one or two acres. Such a mix 
is encouraged by DDS in order to include in each group some women with farm management 
skills. As a lease group the women can also hone their farming skills and ability to function 
HZHNYV\WI\PSK[Y\Z[HUKZVSPKHYP[`HUK[HJRSLJVUÅPJ[ZHUKMYLLYPKPUNILMVYL]LU[\YPUN
into purchase. Defaulters can be evicted. On both leased in and purchased land, women 
practice organic farming and multi-cropping. Some grow up to 24 crop varieties a year (the 
seeds of which they preserve), thus reducing the risk of crop failure and providing a balanced 
Z\IZPZ[LUJLKPL[6UÄLSKIV\UKHYPLZ[OL`WSHU[JYVWZ^OPJOJH[[SLKVUV[LH[[O\Z\ZPUN
the land productively while also creating a crop fence. As noted, the output of each crop 
grown is typically divided into equal portions among the sangam women.
Unfortunately there is no systematic data for the DDS groups, of the kind discussed 
above for the transition economies, to help us compare production gains on group-managed 
farms  with  those  on  individually-managed  ones.  Such  research  is  clearly  needed. 
Nevertheless,  Tables  2a  and  2b  provide  an  illustrative  comparison  between  farming 
enterprises which, according to DDS, are fairly typical. Table 2a relates to a DDS lease 
group in Pastapur village with 13 women cultivating 9 acres, and Table 2b relates to a 2 acre 
farm from the same village, cultivated on a family basis. The information was obtained by 
DDS from two women members in the case of the lease group (Table 2a) and from the 
woman managing the land with her family in the case of the individual family farm (Table 
2b).25 After deducting paid out and imputed expenses, the net returns per acre cultivated are 
20 per cent higher in the lease group. These returns provide women and their families with 
subsistence for about 4–5 months of the year (personal communication, P.V. Satheesh, 
October 2009). For the remaining months they depend partly on produce from their own 
SHUKPM[OL`OH]LHU`HUKWHY[S`VU^HNL^VYR;OLYLHYLHSZVV[OLYWYVK\J[P]P[`ILULÄ[Z
MYVTNYV\WMHYTPUN^OPJO[OLZLÄN\YLZKVUV[JHW[\YL>LLKPUNMVYPUZ[HUJLPZHJYP[PJHS
peak period operation and timeliness is important for yields. Timely completion of weeding 
is  easier  with  group  management  than  in  individually  cultivated  farms  which  have  to 
compete with others for hiring labour during this period.
25 I am grateful to Mr. Suresh Kumar from DDS for obtaining this information for me.20
Table 2a: Women’s land lease group cultivating 9 acres,a Pastapur village  
(Expenses and Returns: June 2008 to March 2009)
Expenditure (Rs)b
Monsoon Crop Winter Crop Annual
Ploughing Payment  6,300   6,000 
Manure Cost and Labour 6,840 -
Seed Cost and Sowing Labourc 780 3,415
Weeding Labourc 3,250 4,850
All Operating Costs 17,170 14,265 31,435
Lease Paid d 10,500
Total Annual Expenditure 41,935
Returns (Rs) 























Total Annual Income 22,850 74,415 97,265
5L[WYVÄ[MVY HJYLZ 55,330
7YVÄ[WLYHJYL 6,147
Notes:  a Group of 13 women cultivating 9 acres
  b 1 Indian Rupee = US$ 47.5 at current rates
  c Imputed cost of seed and women’s labour. Women preserve the seeds; they do not purchase them.
  d Annual instalment on the lease that the group pays to DDS.
Source: DDS, 200921
Group farming has not only helped the women realize many of the earlier-noted potential 
ILULÄ[ZVMQVPU[J\S[P]H[PVUP[OHZHSZVLUOHUJLK[OLPYJHWHIPSP[PLZ;OLZHUNHT^VTLU
have learnt to survey and measure land, hire tractors, travel to town to meet government 
VMÄJPHSZI\`PUW\[ZHUKTHYRL[[OLWYVK\JL*VSSLJ[P]LJ\S[P]H[PVUHSSV^Z[OLTÅL_PIPSP[`
in labour time, cost sharing, and the pooling of their differential skills in farming, accounting, 
and public dealing. 
Table 2b: Single family owner cultivator in two-acre farm, Pastapur village  
(Expenses and Returns: June 2008 to March 2009)
Expenditure (Rs)
Monsoon Crop Winter Crop Annual
Ploughing Payment 1,350 1550
Manure Cost and Labour 900
Seed Cost and Sowing Laboura  1,410 1450
Weeding Laboura 2,750 630
All Operating Costs 6,410 3,630 10,040
Returns (Rs) 










Total Income     20,300
5L[7YVÄ[MVYHJYLZ 10,260 
7YVÄ[WLYHJYL  5,130
Note: a Imputed cost of family labour plus cost of hired labour. 
Source: DDS, 2009 22
One of the Sangam women in Pastapur village (cited in Hall 1999) summarized the 
WLYJLP]LKILULÄ[ZZ\JJPUJ[S`!
>VTLUJHUZOHYL[OLWYVÄ[HUK[OLYLZWVUZPIPSP[`0UPUKP]PK\HSJ\S[P]H[PVUKPMMLYLU[
women have different levels of agricultural knowledge and resources for inputs. 
[Hence] in collective cultivation they may make unequal contributions. Those with 
less can compensate the others through taking a reduced share of the harvest, or by 
YLWH`PUN[OLTPUPUZ[HSTLU[Z+PMMLYLU[SL]LSZVMJVU[YPI\[PVUHYLÄULILJH\ZL[OL
women all know what each others’ resources are. Knowledge of each others’ family 
ULLKZHSZVSLHKZ[V[VSLYHUJLVM^VTLUUV[HWWLHYPUNMVY^VYRPU[OLÄLSKZ[VZVTL
L_[LU[;OLSL]LSZVMZOHYPUNHYLHNYLLKVUHUKÄ_LKILMVYL[OLZLHZVU!LHJO^VTLU
should get an equal share unless her contribution falls below that of the other 
women. There are no disputes about shares: all the women are involved in dividing 
the crop, so none can be accused of taking more than her fair share.
Standard collective action problems are solved by peer pressure. Work shirkers are penalized 
in the groups’ weekly meetings, some of which I have sat in on. The fact that the women in 
each sangam are from the same village and are co-dependent in other ways creates pressure 
against default. As one group told me: ‘We supervise and see if anyone is slackening 
intentionally or due to compulsion…. If a woman is ill she can send other family members 
to substitute. But if a young women does not turn up she has to send two persons the next 
day or give two persons’ wages’. Sometimes groups do break up, but usually reconstitute 
into new and more cohesive ones, and restart joint cultivation. The voluntary nature of 
group formation allows this realignment which is central to institutional success. Moreover, 
having worked together they see the advantages of collective farming and build what has 
been termed, a habit of cooperation.26
7V[LU[PHSJVUÅPJ[ZVMPU[LYLZ[Z\JOHZ[OVZLHYPZPUNPMHZHUNHT^VTHU»ZMHTPS`V^UZ
land and needs her labour, are reported by the women to be minimal in practice, since 
individual time input on the group’s land is not very large, and many women, in any case, 
belong to landless families. Krishnapur’s sangam, for instance, told me: ‘We all know that 
the [sangam] land will yield well. Men know this too. Also the number of days that anyone 
has to put in on the communal land is not excessive, since the whole sangam works together. 
(M[LY[OH[[OL^VTLUJHU^VYRVU[OLPYMHTPS`SHUK:V[OLYLPZUVZLYPV\ZJVUÅPJ[»
(UV[OLYJVTWSL_P[`JHUHYPZL^OLUPUKP]PK\HSJ\S[P]H[PVUILJVTLZTVYLWYVÄ[HISL
say if the family can now afford irrigation. Assured irrigation reduces cultivation risk and 
LUOHUJLZWYVÄ[Z^OPSLPUKY`SHUKMHYTPUNYPZRZOHYPUNPZHUPTWVY[HU[PUJLU[P]LMVYNYV\W
cultivation. Potentially, groups cultivating purchased land are more prone to splitting, since 
26 See Seabright (1997) on how cooperation can be habit forming.23
women have an exit option which they can exercise, or be subject to pressure from their 
families to do so. In practice, such splits among DDS groups are not common. Where they 
have occurred, some have formed new units and others have settled for reduced jointness 
I` JVU[PU\PUN ^P[O SHIV\Y L_JOHUNL HUKVY PU]LZ[PUN JVSSLJ[P]LS` PU PYYPNH[PVU HUK
marketing, while cultivating separately. 
Other gains that women report from group farming are improvement in family diets, 
health  care  and  children’s  education,  enhanced  respect  in  the  community,  and  better 
spousal relations. Women now bargain for higher wages when they need supplementary 
work, since they have a livelihood choice. Bonded labour and caste indignities are also 
reported to have declined. As Ratnamma, a sangam woman (cited in Hall, 1999), noted: 
‘They [the high caste people] used to call us by the caste name which was very derogatory. 
5V^[OL`W\[[OLYLZWLJ[M\SZ\MÄ_·HTTH·HUKZLH[\ZVUHULX\HSIHZPZBPUW\ISPJ
gatherings]. It is only because we have an organization that they [the landlords] … are 
ZJHYLK[VJYVZZ\Z»>VTLUHSZVZH`[OH[SVJHSNV]LYUTLU[VMÄJPHSZNP]L[OLTWYPVYP[`V]LY
individual men. Within the home, women report a decline in domestic violence and greater 
control over their own earnings. Some husbands have returned to their wives after the latter 
purchased land, and most women mention that their spouses now listen more to them. In 
general, men’s perception about women’s capabilities have improved after women began 
to farm collectively. 
A community food security programme has been another positive outcome. In many 
villages in the region, with support from the Ministry of Rural Development, DDS initiated a 
programme to bring fallow land under cultivation, by extending loans to small and marginal 
male farmers through women’s committees which manage the programme. In many cases, 
the  men  had  received  the  land  under  land  reform  but  could  not  cultivate  it  without 
infrastructural support. Under the scheme, each participating farmer can enter two acres and 
NL[HSVHUWH`HISLPUPUZ[HSTLU[ZV]LY[OYLL`LHYZ0UYL[\YUV]LYÄ]L`LHYZ[OLMHYTLYNP]LZ
HZWLJPÄLKHTV\U[VM[OLNYHPUOLOHY]LZ[Z[VHJVTT\UP[`NYHPUM\UKTHUHNLKI`[OL
women. The women’s committees (each usually consists of 5 women overseeing 20 acres) 
ensure that the farmers use the loans for cultivation, supervize the operations, encourage the 
use of organic manure and mixed cropping, and collect the harvest share for the fund. They 
also identify and rank the poor, from the most needy upwards. The poorest are eligible for the 
most grain, sold to them at a nominal price. 
As a result of this venture, a large amount of fallow or underused land is now being 
cultivated. By DDS’ estimates, today 2,580 families across these 51 villages are cultivating 
3,550 acres and in 2008–09 produced 1.4 million kg of extra grain. Typically sorghum is 
inter-croppped with redgram and, occasionally, with maize. In addition, along with other 
local NGOs, DDS has in recent years extended this alternative public distribution system to 
another 67 villages, covering 2,884 families and 2,983 acres of land, and producing an 24
additional 1.2 million kg of mixed grain per year.27 The extra grain contributes to several 
million additional meals. The land also provides fodder for animals. Women’s sangams 
constitute the centre points of these enterprises. 
Some important ingredients of these collectivities, such as a gender-progressive NGO, 
a group approach, and a focus on landless women, can be found in many other grassroots 
initiatives. But the focus on land, linked with group farming, is rare, in contrast to the 
usually less effective income-generating work promoted under many government schemes 
for the poor. Also, these collectivities allow women to access land through the market 
without  depending  on  male-biased  family  inheritance  systems.  And  pooling  land  for 
cultivation helps overcome problems of small size and fragmentation. That these groups are 
all constituted of women is important in that it gives women independent access to assets, 
JVU[YVSV]LYPUJVTLZLSMJVUÄKLUJLHUKZVJPHSZ\WWVY[MYVTNYV\WTLTILYZ^OPJO[OL`
would not easily gain in family-based cooperative farming.
These initiatives have all the ingredients mentioned earlier as conducive to collective 
functioning: they are voluntary in nature, socio-economically homogenous (in terms of 
class  and  gender),  constituted  of  people  who  know  each  other,  small  sized  in  both 
membership and production units, participatory in decision-making (with mechanisms 
instituted for dealing with free riding), and in control of the produce which is shared 
equitably. Gender equity is not an issue since these are all-women groups. Hence, in 
initiation, size, functioning, and composition they are unlike both the socialist collectivization 
and the non-socialist joint farming cooperatives described earlier. 
0U[OPZJVU[L_[P[PZHSZV^VY[OJVUZPKLYPUNHUV[OLY[`WLVMJVSSLJ[P]LHYYHUNLTLU[ÄYZ[
suggested by Agarwal (1994) but untried so far. This alternative would require the government 
to give poor rural women group rights over the land it distributes under various schemes. 
Effectively, the women would be stakeholders in a kind of land trust. Each woman in the 
group would have rights of use but not of alienation. The daughters-in-law and daughters of 
such households living in the village would share these use rights. Daughters marrying 
outside the village would lose such rights but could re-establish them by rejoining the 
production efforts, should they return on divorce or widowhood. In other words, land 
access would be linked formally with residence and working on the land. If such a scheme 
were initiated simultaneously in a group of villages within which there are intermarriages, 
and which constitute what could be termed a marriage circle, then daughters leaving the 
village on marriage would gain rights in their marital village and so obtain livelihood 
security there as well. This would be more workable in regions where marriages tend to be 
within relatively short distances, as in south India (Agarwal 1994). This form of collectivity 
27 Figures provided by Suresh Kumar, DDS, October 2009. The average annual yield for grain was reported to be at least 
400 kilograms per acre.25
could give economic security to poor women, whatever their marital status, encourage 
long-term investment in the land, and bypass problems of the land reverting to male hands 
via inheritance.28 Some NGOs have been receptive to the idea of creating such a land trust 
for women on an experimental basis.
Although the above examples of women’s group farming relate to women who initially 
owned  no  land  themselves  but  subsequently  acquired  some,29  many  aspects  of  their 
functioning could be applied to cases where women are prior owners of some land through 
inheritance, purchase, or State transfer, which they can then pool and jointly cultivate. In 
fact, the women who purchased land via subsidized credit are effectively owners pooling 
[OLPYSHUK/LUJLNYV\WMHYTPUNJV\SKILULÄ[UV[VUS`SHUKSLZZ^VTLUI\[HSZV^VTLU
who own, or have customary rights over small plots. Nor need the formation of groups be 
limited to women. As noted above for Kyrgyzstan and Romania, agricultural collectivities 
could also be constituted of male farmers pooling land and cultivating with family labour, 
given that most landowning rural households in India own less than one hectare. Indeed, 
7H[UHPRKLZJYPILZOV^ZVTLSHUKSLZZILULÄJPHYPLZVM[OLSHUKYLMVYTWYVNYHTTL
undertaken in West Bengal in the 1970s, are now pooling their land for growing vegetables 
and fruits for local urban markets. This has raised and stabilized their incomes and freed 
them from daily wage work. Some others are engaged in cooperative aquaculture. Here, as 
in the DDS case, two factors were especially important catalysts—support from local bodies 
(in this case, local government) and easy credit. 
It is possible, of course, that farmers may be more open to land pooling where they are 
initially landless and receive land from the State or acquire it jointly, than where they have 
been longstanding owners, habituated to individual cultivation. But even among the latter, 
rising food prices or new production opportunities, opened up by higher value crops or 
contract  farming,  or  an  ecological  crisis  arising  from  climate  change  and  requiring 
TP[PNH[PVUHKHW[H[PVU JV\SK JYLH[L JVUKP[PVUZ ^OLYL JVSSLJ[P]L HWWYVHJOLZ ILJVTL
attractive. Where families pool land under predominantly male management, however, 
although the potential productivity gains can be realized, the gender-equity effects would 
be limited, in contrast to women-only farming groups. Women in families pooling land, for 
instance, are likely to continue as unpaid family labour and gain few of the empowerment 
ILULÄ[Z[OH[^VTLUWVVSPUNSHUK^P[OV[OLY^VTLUHYLUV[LK[VIYPUN
The  agricultural  production  collectivities  I  have  described  represent  institutional 
innovations within a market economy and have not been part of any larger land reform 
WYVNYHTTL;OL`^V\SKOV^L]LYV]LYJVTLTHU`VM[OLKPMÄJ\S[PLZTHYNPUHSMHYTLYZ[LUK
28 Although women, if they own land, can legally bequeath it to anyone, there is social pressure to bequeath it to sons. 
Women themselves are often reluctant to bequeath land to daughters since they leave their birth village on marriage.
29 In some cases, however, the women’s families owned small plots.26
to face after land reform, if the land transfer is not accompanied by institutional support for 
JYLKP[PUW\[ZL[J;OLIV[[VT\WJVSSLJ[P]P[PLZHSZVM\SÄS[OLLHYSPLYTLU[PVULKO\THUYPNO[Z
criterion: all the women’s farming groups are constituted of the poor, contribute to livelihood 
enhancement and empowerment, and are participative and voluntary in nature. They use 
inputs from NGOs and the State, but are State supported and not State controlled. Although 
more quantitative research is clearly needed, the existing evidence is a strong pointer that 
group farming can, in particular conditions, prove successful in providing decent livelihoods 
and dignity, especially for the most disadvantaged—namely, poor and low-caste women. 
Their children would also then have greater possibilities of being able to choose other 
livelihood options, say in the service or manufacturing sector. The downside, however, is 
that group farming requires intensive NGO support at the start, and is still geographically 
JVUÄULK-\Y[OLYILSV^0V\[SPULOV^[OPZSPTP[H[PVUJV\SKILV]LYJVTL
5. IS SUCCESS LINKED TO GENDER AND ECOLOGY?
The examples of group farming we have considered cover both voluntary male cooperation, 
on a family basis in the transition economies, and cooperation among all-women groups in 
India. This suggests that under conducive conditions, group farming is possible for both 
men and women. At the same time, for several reasons women’s production collectivities 
may work better than men’s. Rural women are much more resource constrained than men 
and, therefore, have more to gain economically from joint ventures. They share similar 
constraints set by gendered social norms. They are also much more dependent on one 
another because they have fewer livelihood alternatives and hence exit options, than do 
men. This interdependence for everyday survival raises the overall cost of social sanctions 
if cooperation fails, making women less likely than men to free ride. For similar reasons, 
^VTLUTPNO[ILTVYLJVTWLSSLK[OHUTLU[VYLZVS]LJVUÅPJ[ZMHZ[LYHUK[VIL[[LYZ\Z[HPU
collective action (Agarwal 2000). Women in one sangam told me, for instance:




the back of our minds.
Recent research on groups of varying gender composition, managing natural resources in 
developing countries, also indicates that predominantly women’s groups tend to display 
TVYLZVSPKHYP[`HTVUNTLTILYZHUKHYLIL[[LYH[JVUÅPJ[YLZVS\[PVU[OHUWYLKVTPUHU[S`
men’s groups (Westerman et al. 2005). Moreover, in many areas, especially in South Asia, 27
women’s labour exchange systems survive while men’s have been disappearing (Agarwal 
2000). And women’s social networks of marriage alliances and everyday forms of sharing 
are often different from men’s. These networks too provide one of the foundations for women’s 
solidarity and, hence, a basis for cooperation among them. 
Ground experience also indicates that women tend to be more cooperative than men. 
++:^OLUÄYZ[LZ[HISPZOLKPU MVYPUZ[HUJL^VYRLKVUS`^P[OTHSLMHYTLYZ\U[PSHZ7=
Satheesh (Director of DDS) reports, the village women challenged this exclusivity and asked: 
‘Why don’t you work with women?’” This led the organization to promote both men’s and 
women’s  groups,  initially  as  credit-and-thrift  groups.  When  problems  of  corruption  and 
noncooperation undermined the men’s groups, DDS shifted almost entirely to all-women 
sangams. The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh similarly began with men’s savings groups and 
then moved almost entirely to women’s groups.30 Self-help groups in India (discussed below) 
are again predominantly constituted of women. All this does suggest that gender could be an 
enabling factor (albeit not the only factor) in successful group functioning in particular contexts, 
Z[LTTPUNMYVT[OLYLSH[P]LZWLJPÄJP[`HUK]\SULYHIPSP[`VM^VTLU»ZZVJPVLJVUVTPJWVZP[PVU
Another factor that is likely to impinge on the potential of forming successful farming 
collectivities is the extent of ecological vulnerability. Group cultivation may be more successful 
at two ends of the spectrum: (i) in ecologically vulnerable areas where there is subsistence 
rain-fed farming and high risk of crop failure, with associated high payoffs from cooperation; 
and (ii) in areas where irrigated farming and high value crop cultivation is possible, but small 
farm size and individual high risk is a constraint. The case studies of the transition economies 
further suggest that resource imbalances (for example, having labour but inadequate land, or 
the opposite) and other resource constraints under market imperfections are likely to encourage 
cooperation, in addition to past experience of successful cooperation.
,TLYNPUNÄUHUJPHSVYLJVSVNPJHSJYPZLZJV\SKHSZVJYLH[LJVUKP[PVUZJVUK\JP]L[V
farmer cooperation. Steps to adapt to or mitigate climate change, for instance, requires the 
local  implementation  of  projects  such  as  soil  improvement,  rainwater  harvesting,  tree 
WSHU[PUNHUKJYVWKP]LYZPÄJH[PVUHSSVM^OPJOHYLTVYL]PHISLHZNYV\WWYVQLJ[Z
Regionally, the availability of land for groups to lease in or buy is likely to be greater 
where larger numbers have moved out of agriculture, reducing population pressure on 
J\S[P]HISLSHUK-VYPUZ[HUJLHS[OV\NO[OLYLHYLUVJVTWYLOLUZP]LÄN\YLZLTLYNPUNÄLSK
studies in parts of Andhra Pradesh suggest that more land is now available for leasing in 
from large farmers whose sons are no longer willing to farm.31 Of course, the growing 
30 Notwithstanding the contested nature of gains by women in the Grameen Bank groups, it is well accepted that women 
typically cooperate well within the groups.
31 Personal communication in 2008 by Carolyn Elliott (Professor emeritus, political science, University of Vermont) based 
VUOLYYLJLU[ÄLSK^VYRPU(UKOYH7YHKLZO28
demand for land for non-agricultural purposes could well change this picture. Variations in 
local economic and political power balances are also likely to impinge on the ability of 
poor farmers’ groups, and especially of women’s farming groups, to navigate land, input, 
and credit markets.
* * *
Essentially,  group  farming  could  prove  to  be  an  effective  institutional  form  which,  in 
particular contexts, could help alleviate poverty for women and their families, increase 
productivity and food security, enhance social status among socially oppressed groups, and 
empower women economically and socially. But is this replicable? 
In  India,  apart  from Andhra  Pradesh,  there  have  been  small-scale  experiments  of 
women’s group farming undertaken by NGOs in Gujarat and Kerala.32 In addition, a few 
years ago, an UNDP-GOI (Government of India) project sought to involve 50,000 women 
across 1,357 villages in three states (Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Orissa) to farm 
collectively in small groups. The early evaluations were positive and encouraging (see Burra 
2004 and GOI-UNDP 2004-05). There are also examples of women’s groups undertaking 
pisciculture collectively. 
In Bangladesh, similarly, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), a 
major NGO, helps women lease in and cultivate land collectively, despite opposition from 
orthodox village communities. Its early efforts date to the 1970s (Chen 1983), but in the late 
1990s, somewhat more controversially, BRAC itself reported purchasing about 300 acres of 
land in north Bengal (investing about taka 400 million) and leasing it to 1,500 women 
organized in groups, in addition to organizing 20,000 women in groups to lease in land 
from private owners. The women repaid the lease amount from their returns.33 In another 
striking example, landless women formed cooperative groups with support from the NGO, 
Proshika, to acquire minor irrigation equipment and sell water to male farmers who, to take 
advantage of the service, pooled their plots (Wood and Palmer-Jones 1991). 
There  are  also  examples  from  Africa  of  emerging  collective  approaches  to  rural 
livelihoods through asset pooling, such as livestock herders reconsolidating their herds in 
Kenya.34 Indeed, in sub-saharan Africa, where communal systems of land ownership are 
still  widespread,  the  possibility  of  women  farming  collectively  warrants  exploration, 
32 In Gujarat, the NGO, Anandi has tried to promote group farming by women on leased in land; and another NGO, 
Mahiti, has catalysed a women’s collective on leased in and reclaimed uncultivable wasteland to plant animal fodder 
(personal communication, Sejal Dave, Mahiti, 2008). In Kerala women’s groups are leasing in land for vegetable cultiva-
tion (Tharakan 1997).
33 Communication by Md. Aminul Islam, Director BRAC (CPD 2000).
34 Communication by a participant at a workshop on “Poverty and Human Rights”, Kennedy School of Government, 
  Harvard University, 2008, where I presented aspects of this paper.29
although some of the problems women face in getting fair access to land within these 
systems will need to be overcome (see, e.g. Whitehead and Tsikata 2003). 
6. ENHANCING GEOGRAPHIC AND STRATEGIC REACH 
Can successful collectivities, such as those catalysed by DDS in India, or by large NGOs 
elsewhere in South Asia, be replicated more widely across regions and enhanced in scale, 
strategically? By strategic scaling up I do not mean enlarging group size (small size, as noted, 
is more conducive to successful functioning); rather, I mean creating strategic linkages between 
groups. Drawing on India for illustration, I believe a substantial potential for replication and 
enhanced reach lies in encouraging group farming by village self-help groups (SHGs).
There  are  over  2.2  million  SHGs  in  India,  predominantly  constituted  of  women.35 
Typically SHGs are economically homogenous, consisting of 10–12 self-selected women 
who pool their savings and rotate lending within the group. One village can have several 
SHGs. Groups that have a proven record of working together for about six months are eligible 
for a bank loan as a proportion of their group savings deposit. Loans, if taken, go to the 
whole group which then decides its use. Many SHGs, especially those catalysed by NGOs 
have, however, graduated beyond loan disbursements and become advocacy groups, putting 
pressure on village councils to complete long standing projects for village improvement 
(EDA 2006).36 Although most SHGs begin as savings and credit groups, they differ from 
micro-credit groups in important ways (Ramesh 2007; Harper 2002). The latter are formed 
basically around credit,37 can involve women with no proven record of working together, 
loans go to individual women, and there is usually little focus on social advocacy.
Until the early 2000s, two-thirds of the SHGs were being promoted by NGOs, although 
now they are also being catalysed by state governments and banks. Many NGOs formed 
SHGs around savings and credit as an entry point for empowering women. For instance, 
since the early 1980s, MYRADA, in south India,OHZJH[HS`ZLKZLSMOLSWHMÄUP[`NYV\WZ
based on the idea that there will be mutual trust if members have common social or 
geographic origins, or have the same livelihood source, or share gender bonds, or some 
combination of these.38 ;OLZLºHMÄUP[PLZ»LUOHUJLZVSPKHYP[`HUKKPZJV\YHNLMYLLYPKPUN
35 On SHGs, see EDA (2006), Tankha (2002), Nair (2005), APMAS (2007), NCAER (2008), and Deininger and Liu (2009), 
among others.
36:VTLVM:/.ZZ\Y]L`LKI`,+(OHKILLUPU]VS]LKPUZ\JOHK]VJHJ`4HU`NYV\WZOH]LHSZVYLHJOLKV\[
to the very poor (NCAER 2008).
37 They are typically structured on Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank model.
38 Established in 1968, MYRADA works with poor communities in South India and increasingly focuses on women-only 
groups (Fernandez 2005). It is notable that the groups from Central Asia and Latin America are also often formed among 
close relatives or friends.30
Recent surveys show that a fair percentage of SHGs are formed of poor and socially 
disadvantaged women. Half the SHG women in EDA’s (2006) survey were below the poverty 
line, and 55 per cent belonged to the lowest castes or tribes. An all-India survey of 2750 
SHGs in three states, similarly found that in 41 per cent of the SHGs the majority of members 
were from scheduled caste or tribal households, and in 42 per cent the majority were from 
landless families (Nirantar 2007). In NCAER’s (2008) study of 961 SHGs (of various gender 
compositions) in six states, 60 per cent of the members were below the poverty line. 
Deininger and Liu (2009), based on an analysis of two rounds of panel data for 2,400 
household in Andhra Pradesh, found that households (including the poorest) which had 
been SHG members for 2.5 to 3 years, gained in consumption, nutritional intake and asset 
accumulation. 
At the same time, most SHGs, with rare exceptions, take loans for family-based 
TPJYVLU[LYWYPZLZ5*(,9[OLILULÄ[ZVM^OPJOTH`UV[ÅV^[V^VTLU/LYL
involving SHG women in group production, especially joint farming, could enlarge the 
economic scope of these institutions. The typical 10–14 person SHG is the right size to 
successfully take up group farming, based on leased or purchased land, or the pooling of 
ZTHSSMHTPS`WSV[Z;OL`HSZVOH]LÄUHUJPHSYLZV\YJLZHUKSPURZ^P[OIHURZ:VTLHYL
already  involved  in  group  enterprises  such  as  community  forestry,  sericulture,  and 
pisciculture. And some large companies, as noted earlier, have contracted women’s SHGs 
to supply products such as tea. There are also occasional cases of SHGs initiating group 
farming on leased in land.39 Graduating toward group farming would thus be possible for 
many SHGs if land were available and if they received subsidized credit and infrastructural 
support. This  would  help  expand  the  scale  and  geographic  reach  of  women’s  group 
MHYTPUN0U[\YUP[^V\SKTV]L:/.ZV\[VM[OLUHYYV^JVUÄULZVMZH]PUNZJYLKP[HUK
individual or family-based micro-enterprises toward economically stronger and socially 
empowering group enterprises. 
Their impact could, however, be even greater if they were part of an SHG federation 
(a network of individual SHGs). Typically, SHG federations have been promoted by NGOs, 
and today there are an estimated 69,000–89 per cent in southern India, constituted variously 
at the village, panchayat, or district level, with one federation (in Andhra Pradesh) at the 
state level (APMAS 2007). Some federations link 10–40 SHGs, others a few thousand. A 
typical SHG federation is multi-tiered. Federations provide SHGs with bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the government and the market, as well as the capacity to sustain over time.40 
Although it may be too early to speak of federations of women farmers’ groups, since 
the numbers of such groups need to increase and spread, if SHGs were to take up group 
39 The Gujarat NGO, Anandi, for instance, has attempted this.
40 On federations of SHGs, see especially APMAS (2007), Tankha (2002), Nair (2005), and EDA (2006).31
farming on a notable scale their existing networks could serve as a basis for forming 
federations of women’s farming groups as well. Given the regional concentration of SHGs, 
OV^L]LYP[^V\SKWYV]L\ZLM\S[VÄYZ[JVUJLU[YH[LVUWHY[ZVMZV\[O0UKPHLZWLJPHSS`(UKOYH
Pradesh, for testing how well SHGs are able to take up group farming, before expanding it 
to other regions, although there could be some NGOs with strong rural women’s networks 
in other states, which may be interested in trying this out on a pilot basis. 
7. IN CONCLUSION
The poor, especially in market economies, need the strength that collectivities offer for 
creating more economic, social, and political space for themselves, for enhancing their 
socio-economic well-being and voice, and as a protection against free market individualism. 
It is argued here that a group approach to farming, especially in the form of bottom-up 
agricultural production collectivities, offers substantial scope for poverty alleviation and 
empowering the poor, as well as enhancing agricultural productivity. To realize this potential, 
however, the groups would need to be voluntary in nature, small in size, participative in 
KLJPZPVUTHRPUNHUKLX\P[HISLPU^VYRZOHYPUNHUKILULÄ[KPZ[YPI\[PVU;OLYLHYLTHU`
notable examples of such collectivities to be found in varied contexts, such as in the 
transition economies and in India. All of them bear witness to the possibility of successful 
cooperation  under  given  conditions.  And  although  the  gender  impact  of  the  family 
cooperatives in the transition economies are uncertain, the Indian examples of women-
VUS`NYV\WMHYTPUNVMMLYJVUZPKLYHISLWV[LU[PHSMVYILULÄ[PUN^VTLU
The  ideational  impact  of  the  highly  adverse  welfare  effects  of  early  socialist 
collectivization, however, has created a policy blind spot in relation to the varied ground 
YLHSP[`PU^OPJOJVSSLJ[P]P[PLZJVU[PU\L[VÅV\YPZOPUTHU`JVU[L_[ZHUKJV\U[YPLZ;OPZ
remains  a  particularly  serious  barrier  to  shifting  policy  toward  promoting  agricultural 
production collectivities in developing countries such as India. This barrier needs to be 
overcome by wider dissemination of information on existing collective ventures in policy 
circles,41 more research on the conditions under which they emerge and sustain, and greater 
experimentation  with  collective  enterprises  on  the  ground,  especially  by  grassroots 
organizations. Such experimentation would also help reveal how local-level structural 
inequalities of class, caste, and gender might play out and be overcome.
In anticipation, we might also address a question that sceptics could pose: why 
would we expect agricultural production collectivities to succeed today when most did 
41 Two chapters in the Eleventh Five Year Plan include my recommendations for promoting group farming, especially for 
women, and strengthening women’s land rights (see GOI 2008, Chapter 1, Vol. III on ‘Agriculture’; and Chapter 6, Vol. II on 
‘Towards Women’s Agency and Child Rights’). Whether these recommendations will be implemented remains to be seen.32
not historically? One part of the answer lies in the lessons already learnt about the 
features  that  are  conducive  to  forming  successful  collectivities,  in  particular,  the 
WYPUJPWSLZ VM ]VS\U[HYPULZZ NYV\W OVTVNLULP[` VY HMÄUP[` ZTHSS ZPaL WHY[PJPWH[VY`
decision-making, peer-implemented sanctions for work shirking and other forms of free 
YPKPUNHUKLX\P[HISLILULÄ[ZOHYPUN(ZLJVUKWHY[VM[OLHUZ^LYH[SLHZ[MVY:V\[O(ZPH
lies in the mushrooming of civil society groups, especially since the late 1970s. While 
not all groups are motivated by a desire for social transformation, many are. And a third 
part of the answer lies in the prior existence of a wide range of collectivities, especially 
women’s self-help groups. Although most have not tried joint production, some have, 
and many others have the potential of doing so. These can constitute three major pillars, 
which  did  not  exist  in  the  earlier  period,  on  which  new  agricultural  production 
collectivities could be built. 33
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